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Abstract
A visual cryptography scheme (VCS), as proposed by M. Naor and A. Shamir,
encodes a secret image into n different shares. The scheme ensures that only
certain designated combinations of shares can recover the original image,
while other combinations yield, in probabilistic sense, no information about
the secret image. In this thesis, we show that there exist simultaneous visual
cryptography schemes (SVCS), i.e. cryptographic schemes that allow for
multiple secret images to be encoded across a set of n shares. The essential
part of this research is to derive a set of formal definitions used to construct a
valid SVCS and to design and examine different approaches for establishing
valid SVCS constructions. In particular, we describe an SVCS that allows
encoding n 1 distinct secret images across a set of n shares, and include a
program that demonstrates the successful use of this SVCS in the appendix.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
Suppose that a group of n pirates decides to bury a treasure and distribute a
map among them that marks its location. The pirates wish to come back to
this location and uncover it some number of years down the line. However,
they are not sure if all the pirates will be present when they recover the
treasure, in which case vital parts of the treasure map might be missing.
There is also a concern that single portions of the treasure map might disclose
the general area where the treasure has been hidden. In the worst case, the
exact location of the treasure might be revealed. Clearly, cutting the treasure
map into n pieces and distributing those among all participants does not
fully address the concerns of the pirates. They need a solution which will
recover the map by using k out of n map pieces, and they also need to ensure
that combinations of less than k map pieces do not reveal any information
regarding the treasure map. Visual cryptography provides the pirates with
techniques that will allow them to encode their map in this manner.
The concept of visual cryptography schemes (VCS) was developed by
Naor and Shamir in 1994 [1]. It provides users with a method for encoding
a secret image into a collection of equally sized images called shares. It
is common in visual cryptography to refer to all shares as transparencies,
because one retrieves the original secret image by stacking qualifying shares
on top of each other. Since all shares have equal dimensions, the decoding
procedure ordinarily consists of printing shares onto transparent material.
Thus, the secret image recovery process is typically performed visually. In
its basic form, the VCS design requires all shares in the system in order to
decode the secret image, but in its more sophisticated forms, the users have
some power to designate certain combinations of shares to reconstruct the
secret image and other combinations to not reveal any information at all
about the secret image.
Secret image
Share 1 Share 2
Figure 1.1: An example of a VCS. The secret image of the Canadian flag is
encoded into two share images (transparencies).
The images in Fig. 1.1 and 1.2 provide an example of a simple VCS, which
has the capability to encode a black and white image into two shares. Fig. 1.1
contains the secret image, which in this case is a Canadian flag, and the two
share images that are the result of the VCS encoding process. On the other
hand, Fig. 1.2 demonstrates the VCS decoding process by showing the result
obtained through the superposition of the two share images. The resulting
image matches the original secret image of the Canadian flag, although there
is also a noticeable loss of contrast.
Aside from defining VCS's in their paper [1], Shamir and Naor provide
a number of practical implementations for the basic model. Furthermore,
the authors devote a portion of their research to prove bounds for VCS pa
rameters. There are a number of inherent problems that exist within the
VCS concept and are addressed by the authors. Most noticeably, the results
produced by any visual cryptography scheme contain a substantial loss of
contrast, as already demonstrated by the example in Fig 1.2.
A simultaneous visual cryptography scheme (SVCS) utilizes the image
sharing techniques used in VCS's to build a powerful extension of the VCS
system. Instead of sharing only one secret image across a set of participating
shares, the user now has the ability to share multiple secret images. When
Secret Image stinson
Figure 1.2: An example of VCS secret image decoding. The superposition of
the two share images retrieves the secret Canadian flag image.
dealing with a conventional VCS, it is, to decode the secret image, sufficient
that the attacker recovers any comprehensible result with a combination of
shares. However, if we encode, using an SVCS, the secret image with other
images, the attacker is not guaranteed to recover the secret image. Moreover,
there is a chance that she might mistake one of the other images for the secret
image. Using the treasure map analogy from above, suppose that the pirates
decide to use SVCS in order to encode their original treasure map. Aside
from creating an image of the original map, they also create a number of false
maps that are the result of other combinations of shares. When recovered
by an unknowing rival group interested in finding the treasure, the false
maps will throw them off by giving out false information. The attackers
must recover all shares in the systems and exhaustively stack combinations
of share images until they recover all secret images in the system. More
importantly, in terms of the number of shares needed, a SVCS allows users
to more effectively encode a set of secret images. Given n secret images that
we wish to encode across at least n 1 shares, it would require n different
VCS's, where each VCS contains n 1 different share images. On the other
hand, we can achieve the same goal by utilizing one SVCS with n share
images.
In this thesis, we first formalize the notion and present two main defini
tions regarding VCS systems. Alongside of the VCS definitions, we explain
the encoding process for each secret image pixel. In order to further demon
strate various possibilities presented by the concepts of VCS, we include a
brief explanation of extended visual cryptography scheme (EVCS), as pro
posed by Stinson, et. al. [3]. Following the EVCS description, the focus
shifts to a formal representation of SVCS's, in which contains the formal
SVCS definition. A portion of the discourse that follows the SVCS definition
consists of examples of different SVCS's. The first example presented in this
thesis is very simple but it sets the foundation used in developing a powerful
SVCS, which can encode secret image for any n 1 out of n shares in its




Visual cryptography schemes (VCS's) were first proposed by Naor and
Shamir [1]. Given integers n and k such that 1 < k < n and a black
and white secret image, a VCS creates n transparencies, called shares, in
such a way that one can reconstruct the secret image by stacking together
any k distinct shares, but by stacking together fewer than k shares one gets
no information about the secret image. Shares are created one secret pixel
at a time, independently of every other secret pixel, based on the following
procedure.
Create two collections of
"rules"
, Cq and C\ (we discuss below how to create
the rules).
for all pixels p in the secret image do
if p is black, choose at random a rule from C\
if p is white, choose at random a rule from Cq
use the chosen rule to share p
end for
In sharing a secret image pixel, the procedure first breaks it into a col
lection of m subpixels printed so closely together that they appear to form
a single lightness value. Each
"rule"
in Cq and C\ dictates the color of each
subpixel. We represent each rule by an n x m Boolean matrix, where each
row of the matrix corresponds to one of the n shares in the VCS, and the
columns represent the subpixels assigned to each share. Black subpixels are
depicted by l's and white pixels by O's. A collection Ct, where i {0, 1}, of
r matrices, is often generated by taking one n x m Boolean matrix, called a
basis matrix, that meets the requirements for encoding a black (white) pixel,
and including in the collection every possible column permutation on said
matrix. Matrices M in Fig. 2.2 and Fig. 2.3 help visualize this notion. We
emulate the above-mentioned superposition of k shares of a single pixel by
extracting the corresponding rows of the appropriate n x m Boolean matrix
M
, performing a Boolean OR operation on the columns of these k rows, and
obtaining a vector V of length m (Fig. 2.2 and Fig. 2.3). In order to dif
ferentiate between black and white pixels, we calculate the Hamming weight
H(V) of the vector. Parameter d is a fixed threshold, where 1 < d < m
and a > 0. We call the value a the relative difference and it describes the
difference in weight between vectors V that result from encoding a white and
a black pixel in the secret image. In case where H(V) > d, we interpret the
gray level of the vector V as black, as demonstarted by the example in Fig.
2.2. Similarly, Fig. 2.3 shows that if H(V) < d am, then the gray level of
vector V describes a white pixel.
The table in Fig. 2.1 explains the encoding and decoding processes illus
trated in Fig. 1.1 and 1.2. For each pixel of the secret image, the shares are
assigned a collection of two subpixels, one of which is white and the other is










The collection C\ contains the matrices
and
We say that collections Cq and C\ constitute a VCS if the following con
ditions are met.
Definition 2.1. [1, Definition 2.1] A solution to the k out of n VCS con
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Figure 2.1: VCS encoding and decoding on the pixel level. The table contains
all possible combinations of subpixels for a white or black secret image pixel
and the results of their superposition.
pixel, the user randomly chooses one of the matrices in Cq, and to share a
black pixel, the user randomly chooses one of the matrices in C\ . The chosen
matrix defines the color of the m subpixels in each one of the n transparen
cies. The solution is considered valid if the following three conditions are
met:
1. For any S in Cq, the
"or"
V of any k out of n rows satisfies H(V) <
d am.
2. For any S in C\, the
"or"
V of any k out ofn rows satisfies H{V) > d.
3. For any subset {i\,i2, , iq} of {1,2, ... , n} with q < k, the two col
lections of q x n matrices T>t for t {0, 1} obtained by restricting each
nxm matrix in Ct to rows i\, 12, , ig are indistinguishable in the sense
that they contain the same matrices with the same frequencies.
The superposition of the shares from the example in Fig. 2.1 can be used
to reconstruct the secret image pixel, due to the fact that H(V) = 1 for
all M G C0 and H(V) 2 for all M Cx. Furthermore, it is evident that
restricting all matrices in collections Cq and C\ to a single row, results in two
collections that are indistinguishable in the sense that they contain the same
matrices with the same frequencies because they will always contain matrices
[1 0] and [0 1] . The collections Cq and C\ used in the Canadian flag example
meet the conditions of Definition 2.1 and therefore constitute a valid VCS.
1 Hfjrjrj
Extract rows Result of Vector V




Figure 2.2: An example of black pixel encoding in a 2 out of 4 VCS. The first
step of the encoding process entails extracting any two rows of the matrix
M C\, and this example uses rows 3 and 4. Vector V is the result of
a Boolean
"OR"
operation performed on the two extracted rows and its







Extract rows Result of Vector V







Figure 2.3: An example of white pixel encoding in a 2 out of 4 VCS. Ex
tracting any two rows from the depicted matrix M Cq produces a vector
V whose Hamming weight is 1. As in the previous example, the rows used
for the encoding are 3 and 4.
Naor and Shamir present two different general n out of n VCS construc
tions. The first VCS has the parameters m = 2", a = l/2n, and r = 2"!
[1, Lemma 4.1], and the second has parameters m 2n~1, a = 1/2"-1, and
r = 2n_1! [1, Lemma 4.2]. Furthermore, the authors show that the parame
ters a and m of the second VCS are optimal for all n out of n VCS's.





Noar and Shamir use their general construction of a n out of n VCS, and
apply those results in the general construction of a A; out of n VCS. The
authors describe the steps necessary to perform this transformation, and
prove the following theorem in order to provide optimal bounding values for
a k out of n VCS.
Theorem 2.3. [1, Theorem 5.2] For any n and k there exists a VCS with
parameters m =
nk
2k~1, a = (2e)~k/V27rk, and r nk(2k~1\).
Stinson et al. extend Naor and Shamir's model [1] to general access struc
tures, where an access structure is an explicit specification of all forbidden
and qualified subsets of share images [3]. The authors define a VCS over
a 3-tuple (Tq,Tf ,m), where the pair (rQ,T>) is called the access structure
[2]. Tq and Fp are subsets of the powerset over some set P = {1, . . . , n} of
shares. The set Tq is called the qualifying set and Fp is called the forbid
den set. Each element of Fq represents a subset of P that can recover the
secret image, and each element of Fp represents a subset of P that cannot
reconstruct the secret image. If Fp is monotone decreasing, Fq monotone
increasing, and Fq U Fp =
2P
,
then (Fq,Ff) is said to be strong [3, p.3].
In this case, "monotone
decreasing"
means that subsets of all members in
Fp are themselves included in Fp, and "monotone
increasing"
means that
supersets of all members in Fq are themselves included in Fq.
Stinson et al. also differentiate between weak and strong VCS models.
The main difference between the two models is found in the requirements
for the security condition of the sharing scheme. A weak VCS guarantees
that the participants in a forbidden set of the scheme cannot retrieve any
information on the secret image by examining their shares and the original
images associated with them. A strong VCS requires that by inspecting the
shares associated with any of the original n images of any non-qualifying
subset of shares one gains no information about the secret image.
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Stinson et al. use the term w(Mx) to express the Hamming weight of a
vector given by the Boolean
'OR'
of some rows in matrix M. More precisely,











and w(M) as m 2_, 1 f (1 aij)-
3=1 i=l
Given the concepts presented by Naor and Shamir and the notion of
access structures presented by Stinson et al., we would like to use them
in order to define VCS's more rigorously. For example, we distinguish the
Boolean matrices in each Ci by an index value, and we use w(M) instead
of H(V). The following definition will prove useful in creating simultaneous
visual cryptography schemes (SVCS), which we describe in the next chapter.
Definition 2.4. For n N; let (rQ,rir) be an access structure on the set
V = {1, . . . ,n}, where rQ,rF
C2P
For r N and i {0, 1}, let Ci be
a collection of n x m Boolean matrices Ci
= {Mhl, . . . , Mhr}. We obtain
a ((FQ,Fp,m)-VCS) if, for each X FQ, there exist a G R and tx N
satisfying both of the following.
1. Any qualified set X = {i\, . . . , ip} 6 Fq can recover the shared image i
by stacking their transparencies.




2. Any forbidden set X Fp has no information on any of the shared
images.
Formally, for any X Fp there exists a permutation n on the set




Essentially, Definition 2.6 defines the requirements for basis matrices for
all VCS's. Instead of explicitly defining a series of basis matrix definitions for
individual VCS's, we would like to refer to a single definition for all systems.
As discussed previously in this chapter, we can construct any Cs in a VCS
by finding a matrix M CS, and including all possible column permutations
of M in Cs. The same principle applies for extended VCS's and SVCS's,
because they also use Boolean matrix collections C3. Given that it is possible
for Cs to contain multiple instances of a Boolean matrix M, we define it as
a collection instead of a set for all SVCS's. This property is essential in
preserving isomorphism between all defined Cs in a SVCS. Extended VCS's
are discussed later in this chapter, and the next chapter of this thesis contains
a detailed discussion of SVCS's. We now formally define VCS basis matrices
as follows.
e?r(l)
Definition 2.5. Let P^ be amxm matrix, such that Pv = , where
it is a permutation of {I, ... , m} and e^ is the
ith
vector in the identity matrix
Im. Then Pn is referred to as permutation matrix.
Definition 2.6. Letp,n,m N andi {!,... ,p}. Given a VCS, we call the
collections Ci used to share secret image pixel share collections. Furthermore,
let S\, . . . , Sp be n x m Boolean matrices and let E; be a collection of n x m
Boolean matrices, such that SiPv, Si El; where i {1, . . . ,p\. S\, . . . , Sp
are the basis matrices of the VCS, if Ci = {M\M E;}.
Naor and Shamir discuss various possible extensions of VCS, such as: the
possibility of concealing the existence of the secret image and the problem of
visual encryption of a continuous tone image. By "continuous tone
image"
,
the authors mean an image whose
pixels'
gray levels range from 0 to 255.
Thus, the VCS framework defined by Naor and Shamir in [1] does not directly
apply to such images. Assuming that the secret image is broken up into two
separate shares, the authors propose a solution that does not require the
pixels of the secret image to be broken up into collections of subpixels. In
their solution, each pixel of the secret image is, for each share image, encoded
as a rotated half circle:
When the two half circles (with rotation angles a and b) are
carefully aligned, the superposition of the two half circles can
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range in color from medium grey (representing white) to com
pletely black (representing black) depending on the relative angle
a b between the two rotated circles. If we choose for each pixel
in each share a random absolute rotation angle (with the desired
relative rotation angle between them), then each transparency
will look uniformly grey and will reveal absolutely no informa
tion, but the superposition of the two transparencies will be a
darker version of the original continuous tone image.
Secret images in a VCS are shared as images that appear to be nothing
but randomly chosen black and white pixels. Stinson et al. study visual
cryptography schemes, where each shared image can be anything the encoder
chooses [2] . In our treasure map analogy, this would translate into the pirates
encoding the secret map into, say, pictures of other, false maps or innocent
pictures of disparate objects. Essentially, we are left with a method that,
for some n N+, allows a secret image to be encoded into n completely
unrelated and misleading images. The authors call a VCS that facilitates
this capability an extended visual cryptography scheme (EVCS).
In this chapter we will only consider the construction of the weak EVCS
model. The weak EVCS model is realized by starting out, for some n N
such that n > 2, with a collection of n+1 images: n images, each correspond
ing to a share, and the secret image. The main difference between the VCS
and EVCS models lies in the construction of the collection of matrices used
in pixel encoding. Rather than having two collections Cq and C\ for creating
shares, as in the VCS model, we now have
2"
pairs, c0Cl'-,Cn,CiCl'''Cn, where
c\, . . . , cn {0, 1}, of matrix collections. We use the matrix collections as
follows: Let 0 denote a white pixel, and 1 denote a black pixel. To encode a
pixel in the secret image, we choose a matrix from
CcCl'
",Cn, where c {0, 1}
is the color of the secret pixel, and for each i {1, . . . , n}, q {0, 1} is the
color of the corresponding pixel in share i.
Stinson et al. define an EVCS for an access structure F as follows:
Definition 2.7. [3, Definition 3.1] Let {Fq,Ff) be an access structure on
a set of n participants and m, n, r N. A family of
2n
pairs of share col





{M*'1, .. .,M^r}, d,...,cn {0, 1}, and i {0, 1}, constitutes a weak
((FQ,FF,m)-EVCS), if there exist values a R and tx N satisfying the
following conditions.
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1. Any qualified set X {ix, i2, . . . , ip} Fq can recover the shared im
age.
Formally, for any X FQ and for any {cu. . . , c {0, 1}} the thresh
old tx and relative difference a are such that for any M
C0Cu '"'Cn
we
have that w(Mx) <tx-a-m; whereas, for any M
CiCl'-,c"
it results
that w(Mx) > tX-
2. Any (forbidden) set X = {ii,i2,- ,ip} Fp has no information on
any of the shared images.
Formally, for any ch, . . . , cip {0, 1}, any i {0, 1}, and for any X
Fp, there exists a permutation ir on the set {1, . . . , r}, such that for any
k {1, . . . , r} it holds that (M^k)x = (M'*W)X, where M
CiCl'-'Cn
3. After encoding, the original innocent-looking images are still meaning
ful, that is, any user will recognize the image on her transparency.
Formally, for any j {l,...,n}, X = j and any
{ci, . . . , Cj-i, Cj+i, . . . , cn} {0, 1} it results that w(Mx) > w(M'x),
where M c1ci--c>-i1cj+i.-.c and
M'
c0=i.-.c3-iOcJ+1,...,cn>
The first part of the EVCS definition ensures that a set of qualified shares
(i.e. a member of Fq), has the ability to correctly reconstruct the secret
image by stacking the corresponding transperencies together. The second
condition ensures the security of the system by stating that by inspecting
each share individually or by stacking together transparencies that belong to
a non-qualified set in Fp, one gains no insight into the construction of the
secret image. The last condition mandates that the original images will still
be recognized after they are encoded within the EVCS. In other words, after
the n shares are encoded using the
2n
collections CiCl'"''Cn,CoCl'"''c'1, users
will still be able to easily identify the original images on their respective
transparencies.
The discussion in this chapter provides information about research efforts
in the field of visual cryptography that is for the most part limited to two
papers: Shamir and Naor's initial first publication about visual cryptography
and the discussion of EVCS's by Stinson et al. We believe that supplying
this information is vital in generating a necessary foundation for a discussion
of our research results. However, it must be noted that there exist several
other important contributions on the subject that we elected not to discuss
in detail. A significant part of the research papers in the visual cryptography
14






This section defines and shows how to construct simultaneous visual cryp
tography schemes (SVCS). An SVCS enables the user to encode an arbitrary
number of secret images across a single set of shared images. As in our
discussion of VCS's and EVCS's, we assume that there are no isolated par
ticipating shares. In other words, no single share will contain an entire secret
image.
As is with aVCS, with a SVCS we start out with a set P of n participating
shares. Recall that in an access-structure-based VCS one may place a subset
of P in a qualifying or forbidden set, depending on whether one wishes for
the subject to recover the image or to not be able to recover anything about
the image. Since a SVCS contains multiple secret images, we require each
secret image to have its own qualifying set. A single forbidden set, in which
belonging to the forbidden set means the shares gain nothing about any secret
image, will suffice. Within this forbidden set we store all share combinations
that do not decode any of the secret images.
Definition 3.1. Let q,n,m G N and V = {1, . . . ,n}. Let Fp C
2V
and, for
all i {1, . . . , q}, let Fq{ C
2v
such that 1"^ C\ Fp = 0. Then, we refer to
the (q + l)-tuple (Fq1, . . ,Fqq,Fp) as a simultaneous access structure.
In order to prevent a set of attackers from one qualifying set from gaining
information about the secret image associated with some other qualifying set,
the SVCS definition adds to the security requirements of a VCS one addi
tional requirement. The following definition formally states the requirements
16
for a SVCS on a simultaneous access strucure.
Definition 3.2. For n,q N, let (FQl, . . . ,FQq,FF) be a simultaneous
access structure on the set V = {l,...,n}. For each s {0,1}", let
Cs = (Ms' ,.. . ,Ms'r), be a collection of n x m Boolean matrices. A simul
taneous visual cryptography scheme (rQl, . . . , Tq,, TF,m)
- SVCS exists if
there are values a 6 R andtx N, where X FQi and i {1, . . . , q}, that
satisfy the following conditions:
1. For any i {1, . . . ,q}, any qualified set X FQi can recover the shared
image i by stacking their transparencies.
Formally, there exists tx N such that, for any s
{0, ly-^iO,
l}-*-i
and k {l,...,r} it holds that w(Ms/) <
tx
-
a-m, and for any s {0, l}i_1l{0,
l}9"1"1
and k {1, . . . , r} it
holds that w(MsxJi) > tx.
2. Each forbidden set X Fp has no information on any of the shared
images.
Formally, for any X = {i\,i2, , ip} Fp and any
s,s'
{0, l}9,
there exists a permutation it on set {1, . . . , r} for any k (1, . . . , r}
such that Ms/ =
MxMk)
3. Any qualifying set X Tgi (where i {1, . . . , q}) has no information
on any other shared image.
Formally, for any i {l,...,q}, any X {i\,i2,-- ,iP}







{0, 1}!-1{1}{0, l}9-2-1,), there exists a permutation w on {1, ... , r} such





The first property of the definition deals with the contrast of the im
age. Instead of having only two r-tuples of matrices to choose from, as in
a VCS, in an SVCS with n shared images there are
2
r-tuples of Boolean
matrices. As mentioned previously and in a manner analogous to the se
curity requirements of the VCS, members of the forbidden set provide no
information, in a probabilistic sense, about any of the secret images. Thus,
by the definition of an SVCS, given any pair of distinct r-tuples of n x m
Boolean matrices Cs and Cy, where s,
s'
{0, 1}", restricting all matrices in
Cs and Cs> to rows corresponding to any forbidden set X Fp will result
in a pair of tuples of matrices that are permutations of each other. The
17
third requirement strengthens the overall security of the system. It states





will produce matrices indistinguishable up to a column permutation when
restriced to rows corresponding to any X FQi. By ensuring that such val
ues are used to represent each white (black, respectively) pixel of a secret
image shared by the SVCS, we attain uniformity in the encoding process,
which prohibits us from accidently giving away information about the secret
image in question.
With the SVCS definition in place, we now focus on explicit constructions
of SVCS's. We will first consider a simple SVCS that contains two distinct
secret images and is created by merging together two VCS's. Then we will
present another way of realizing a more efficient and powerful n \ out of n
SVCS.
3.1 A Very Simple SVCS System
The SVCS in this example is created by using two distinct VCS's whose
shares are composed of members of an identical set of shares. Given a VCS
that contains two disjoint qualifying sets, we show how to construct an SVCS
with two different secret images. We present our construction in Theorem
3.4 and prove its correctness. Theorem 3.4 uses Lemma 3.3, which we state
and prove below.
Lemma 3.3. Let n,m,k N and let M and N be Boolean matrices of
size n x m such that M ^ N . Let M and N be indistinguishable up to a
column permutation, so that there exists a permutation matrix PTi such that
MPV = N. Then after inserting the exact same k rows, each containing








Proof. Matrices M and N are modified in the same manner, such that the
same k rows are added to the matrices in the same positions. Multiplying
a vector V of length m that contains all the same elements with Pw yields




The formal definition of the SVCS is presented in the theorem below,
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which is followed by an extensive proof that ensures the validity of the pro
posed system in accordance to Definition 3.2.
Theorem 3.4. Let FQl and Fq2 be subsets
of2v
such that, for all Xx FQl
and X2 FQ2, XxnX2 = 0, and let FRi = {Z\ (3 Xt FQl UFq2) [Zf\X{
0]}. Let Fp, =
2V
- {X D Y\Y FQl}
-
FRl and Fp2 =
2V
- {X D
Y\Y Fq2} Fr2. If there exists a (FQl,FFl,m)-VCS and a (FQ2,Fp2,m)-
VCS, then there exists a (FQl, FQ2. Fp2 n FFl)-SVCS.
Proof. Without loss of generality, let Co,/ denote the Boolean matrix col
lection C0 of a (FQl,FFl,m) VCS, where I {1,2}. Furthermore, let
a = min{ai,a2}; where, for I {1,2}, a\ is the relative difference of the
{Fq^Fpl,m) VCS. We construct basis matrices
Stj
,
where i,j {0,1}, for
the (Fq1,Fq2,Ff2 n IVJ-SVCS. Since the members of Fq, and Fq2 do not
share common elements, we can build
5y'
in the following manner:
For i,j {0,1}, Choose some M C^i and, for all X Fq,





row of M so that






row of M so that Sx = Mx.
Let each remaining row of
5y
contain only zeros.
We construct Boolean matrix collections Cid- by using
Slj
Cij as a SVCS
basis matrix in accordance to Definition 2.6, so that we obtain an r-tuple of
Boolean matrices Cy = (M^1, . , Ml^r)
We will now prove that the above construction meets the requirements
imposed by Definition 3.2 and that
Slj
represents a valid SVCS basis matrix.
Below, for each of the three requirements of the SVCS, we justify this claim.
1. Considering the construction of this SVCS and the definitions 2.6 and
3.2, we know that for any X FQl and any M C0,i, where I {1, 2},
we get w(Mx)
< tx a m, and for any M C\ti it holds that
w(Mx) > tx, so that also for all M C0j and k {l,...,r}, it
holds that w(Mxj'k) < tx
-
a m, and for all M Cy, it holds that
w{M]i'k) > tx. Thus, X meets the first requirement of Definition 3.2.
2. For this requirement choose X FFl D i>2. We have to consider three
possible cases for members of the forbidden set:
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(a) Suppose that for any Y FQl U Fq2 it holds that X n Y = 0. By












{1, . . . , r}. Thus, X satisfies the second
condition of Definition 3.2.
(b) Suppose that for some Y FQl U Fq2, we have X C Y, and
suppose WLOG that Y G T^. By the SVCS construction and
Definition 2.4, it holds that
Mfk
= Mx, for any i {0,1}
where
Ml
Citi, so that there exists a permutation matrix Pn




Cs> it holds that





X satisfies the second condition of Definition 3.2.
(c) Suppose that for any Y G FQl U rQ2, X nY ^ 0, Y ^ X and Y <
X. In other words, X can contain combinations of a strict subset
of any member of a qualifying set and shares that are strictly
in the forbidden set. Let J C X, where .7 fl Y = 0, and let
K C X, where K C.Y and JUK = X. We know that there exist




Cs, it holds that MfP* =
Msyk'






3.3 and the construction of the SVCS, we know that there exists








{1, . . . ,r}. Thus, X satisfies the second condition of
Definition 3.2.
3. By the SVCS construction and WLOG, for all possible
M^k
C0j,
let M C0,i and it holds that
Mxj'k
= Mx, where j {0,1},
k {l,...,r}, X FQl. Thus, X satisfies the third condition of
Definition 3.2.
?
Although we have proved it to be valid and functional, the simple SVCS
system described in this section contains severe restrictions in its definition.
A major limitation of the system is obvious: The conditions imposed on the
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construction of the forbidden sets FFl and r>2 , whose intersection makes up
the forbidden set for the entire SVCS system, are severe. The system assumes
no solution for sets of shares that are supersets ofmembers of either qualifying
set, as well as sets that partially contain members of both qualifying sets
FQ, and Fq2. Therefore, the SVCS is only secure if attackers examine sets
of shares that are subsets of any member of one of the qualifying sets, are
not found in any member-set of a qualifying set, or both. We would like an
SVCS system whose definition includes less restrictive requirements for the
forbidden set.
3.2 Ann-1 out of n SVCS
In this section we describe a n 1 out of n SVCS, where n represents the total
number of shares. The design of the system enables every possible combina
tion of n 1 shares to represent a pixel in its respective secret image. Since
there are n possible combinations of n 1 shares and each can reconstruct
either a black or a white pixel of one secret image, the SVCS must provide
2n
different collections Cs, where s = {0,
1}
The description of regular VCS's has already shown, by distinguishing
between strong and weak VCS systems, that there exist valid sharing schemes
that include combinations of shares whose results are not necessarily included
in the forbidden or qualifying set. In comparison to the above-described
basic SVCS, the SVCS presented in this section is more powerful in regard
to security and the restrictions imposed on forbidden and qualifying sets.
However, we increase the number of subpixels per share in order to facilitate
these improvements.
The basic underlying principle utilized in the construction of this SVCS
system is to horizontally concatenate basis matrices of VCS systems in order
to create basis matrices for the resulting SVCS. Before we discuss the general
construction of n 1 out of n SVCS's, we prove a second lemma, which is
about properties of horizontal concatenation. This lemma contains an oper
ation that is extensively used in this SVCS construction. We also formally
define the notion of horizontal concatenation of matrices in Definition 3.5.
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Furthermore, let C be a n x 2m Boolean matrix that is the result of a








Lemma 3.6. Let Mi, M2, Nlt and N2 be nxm Boolean matrices such that,
formx m permutation matrices Pv, and PT2 it holds that M^P^, = M2 and
NiPn2 = N2. Then there exists a 2m x 2m permutation matrix P3 such that
(MilNJP^ = (M2\N2).




then (Ml\Nl)P1t3 - (M2\N2).
D
In the following definition, we formally define the requirements for the k
out of n SVCS.
Definition 3.7. For n,k,q N, a k out of n SVCS is a
(FQ...,FQq,Fp,m) - SVCS, where q = (), for each X C V such
that \X\ = k there is an i {l,...,q} such that Fq% = {X}, and
FF = {X CV\\X\<k}.
The following theorem contains a formal construction of a n 1 out of n
SVCS and is directly followed by a proof of its validity.
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Theorem 3.8. Given an (n - 1) out of (n - 1) VCS with Boolean matrix
collections Cq and Cx, choose for each i {0, 1} a matrix Bt Ci. For each
j {l,...,n} let Dhj be the unique matrix satisfying (Aj){i,...,n}-{j} = Bi
and w((Did){j}




\DCntn. Let M Cs and form the Boolean matrix share
collection Cs =
(MS>1
, Ms'r) by usingM as the basis matrix in accordance
to Definitions 2.6 and 3.2. Then the collections {Cs = s {0, 1}"} form an
n-1 out of n SVCS.
Proof. We prove that the above theorem provides an SVCS construction that
meets all the requirements imposed by Definitions 3.2, 3.7 and 2.6, and thus
is a valid n 1 out of n SVCS.




Cs and X FQj, it results that
Mx*
is the equivalent of n horizontal concatenations of matrices
(Dn,i)x\ ' ' ' \(Dcf,f)x\ \(DCn,n)x- Given the SVCS construction, we
know that, for any X Fq}, we obtain (Dc j)x = BCj. Thus, it holds
that w((DCid)x)
< tx - a m, if Cj
= 0, and w((DCjij)x) > tx, if
Cj
= 1. For all other (DCgt9)x and {DChth)x, where j ^ g, j ^ h
and h / g, it holds that there exist J,
J'
X, \J\ = \J'\ = 1
such that (Dc g)j = {DCh^)j' = R- Furthermore, it holds that, for
Y = {X} {J} and
Y'
= {X} {J'}, there exists a permuta
tion matrix Pv such that (D^^yP-k = (DCh.,h)Y'- Thus, we obtain
w({DCg,g)x)
=
w((DCh,h)x), and we know that for any X FQj, it
results that w(M%k) < tx
-
a m and w(Msxk) > tx, if Cj
= 0, Cj
= 1




Cs and all X Fp, it results that Ms/
is the equivalent of n horizontal concatenations of matrices
(DClil)x| \(DCfJ)x\ \(DCn:n)x. For all \X\
=
z, where 1 < z <
n 1, it holds that for z matrices {DCfj)x we obtain (DCfj)x
= {Bi)x-
By Definition 2.4 we know that there exists a permutation matrix P*
such that {BCj)xP-k = (BCg)x, where j ^ g. Given Lemma 3.3, we
know that for the remaining n z matrices {DCfj)x it holds that there
exists a permutation matrix P^ such that {DC]j)xPtt
= {DCg,g)x if






Cs, and s ^ s, and
X meets the second requirement of Definition 3.2.
3. For all Ms* Cs and X FQj, it results that Ms/
is the equivalent of n horizontal concatenations of matri
ces (DClil)x\--.\(DC/tf)x\...\(DCnin)x. Let WLOG
s,s'
{0,1}1-1{0}{0,1}"-'"1, and Ms'-k C,., so that
Msxk
is
the equivalent of n horizontal concatenations of matrices
(D'Cl,i)x\ \{D'CfJ)x\ KD'c.n)*. Referring to the SVCS construc
tion, we know that {DC]J)X = BCj = {D'Cjtj)x. Furthermore, given
Lemma 3.3, we know that for all other (DCftf)x and (D'CfJ)x it holds
that {DC!f)xPir = (D'Cfj)x. Thus, X meets the third requirement of
Definition 3.2.
4. Given that for all X FF it holds that 1 < |X| < n
-
1, and for all
Y G FQ] it holds that \Y\ = n 1, there are q = (n"J = n qualifying
sets Fq^ Thus, the SVCS is a valid n 1 out of n in accordance to
Definition 3.7.
D
1 ???? > DDI
2 DUil 2 DBBU
3 ?? 3 nnun
4 DBCB * DID!
i DDBB i DDBB
2 DDDD 2 DBBD
3 DIID 3 DID!
4 DID! ^ ????
Figure 3.1: Example of four [DoJ) matrices for a 3 out of 4 SVCS. Thematrix
in the top left corner is (Z^o.i)- Its first row contains only white subpixel, and
the remaining three rows comprise matrix Bo- The matrix in the bottom left
corner is (D0i2), and matrices (Dog) and (i?o,4) are depicted on the right side
of the figure.
Fig. 3.1 and 3.2 show visual examples of a (D0j) Boolean matrix, re
spectively {Dij), in a 3 out of 4 SVCS, in order to further help demonstrate
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1 ???? ' DDI
2 DDBB 2 DID!
3 DID! 3 ????
4 BDDB ^ ??
1 DDBB i DDBB
2 ???? 2 DBDB
3 DBDB 3 BDDB
^ BDDB < nnnn
Figure 3.2: Example of four (Dld) Matrices for a 3 out of 4 SVCS. The matrix
in the top left corner is (i?i,i). Its first row contains only white subpixel, and
the remaining three rows comprise matrix Bi . The matrix in the bottom left
corner is (Dit2), and matrices (DU3) and (D1A) are depicted on the right side
of the figure.
how to construct basis matrices for a n 1 out of n SVCS. For both Fig.
3.1 and 3.2, it holds that each of the four pictured matrices contains one row
R that contains only white elements, represening zeros in a Boolean matrix.
Furthermore, we see that for Fig. 3.1, Fig. 3.2 respectively, row R is located
in different row for each of the pictured four matrices.
In Fig. 3.3, we see that matrix
S0000
is the result of a horizontal concate
nation of four matrices pictured in Fig. 3.1. Similarly, matrix
51111
is the
result of concatenating the four matrices pictured in Fig. 3.2. It is highly
important to note that for each matrix S in Fig. 3.3, each of the four matri
ces D that are used for the horizontal concatenation operation must contain
a row R, but it must not be at the same position, as demonstrated by the
matrices in Fig. 3.1 and 3.2.
Referring to Fig. 3.4, we observe the difference in results after performing
a Boolean OR on rows {1, 2, 3} and {2, 3, 4}, respectively, thus proving that it
is possible to establish a difference in contrast between combinations of shares
representing a white pixel and combinations representing a black pixel of a
secret image.
In the above-described SVCS, we assume that the system contains n secret
images and that each secret image requires a combination ofn 1 shares for its
decoding process. Given its construction and the lack of restrictions imposed
on the forbidden set FF of then 1 out of n SVCS, it becomes evident that we













Figure 3.3: The resulting basis matrices for a 3 out of 4 SVCS. Matrix
S0000
consists of a horizontal concatenation of matrices (A),i), (A),2), (A),3),
and (>0,4), and matrix
5'0001
of (D0,i), (0,2), (AvO, and '{D1A). Following
the same pattern, the matrix
Snu
is represented by the concatenation of



















5s to top three rows produces the
following vector after Boolean OR:
Restrictingmatrix
S* to bottom three rows produces:
DII1DIIIDIIII1DI
Figure 3.4: Example of resulting vectors V for a basis matrix
S0001
of a 3
out of 4 SVCS. The Hamming weight of the vector obtained by extracting
the top three rows from the matrix is greater than the Hamming weight of
the vector obtained by a combination of any other three rows.
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In this thesis, we first presented a general discussion of VCS's, by intro
ducing the notions of pixel encoding and secret image decoding, then we
discussed the formal VCS definition provided by Naor and Shamir [1]. We
also included a number of theorems from Naor and Shamir's work, specifically
theorems defining bounds on values for VCS parameters. We introduces two
new definitions. First, we introduced a new, more rigorous VCS definition
that features new notation and better suits our research efforts, and then we
introduced a definition that lists the formal requirements for all basis matri
ces. We concluded the general discussion of VCS's by discussing proposed
VCS extensions, which also included a brief discussion of EVCS's. With the
discussion of VCS's as our basis, we utilized these results to formally define
SVCS's and its parameters, as well as develop security measures to ensure
their stability. Furthermore, we introduced two general SVCS constructions
in the thesis. The first SVCS entailed a very simple and restricted scheme,
whereas the discussion of the n 1 out of n SVCS demonstrated how to
construct a more complicated and powerful system.
With the formal definition of SVCS's in place, there exists an immediate
need to formally define the bounding values for SVCS parameters. In partic
ular, we believe that the next step in this research would focus on finding the
bounding values for the pixel extension value m for an n 1 out of n SVCS.
Other possible extensions of this thesis include developing a k out of n SVCS,
where 1 < k < n, and defining the bounding values for its parameters.
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Below we present an example of a 2 out of 3 SVCS, which we generated
by developing a small application. We wrote this simple SVCS application
in Java and partially based it on code from the EVCK system developed
by Dario Fiore. The EVCK code is available from Dario Fiore's website
(http://www.scoutweb.it/dariofiore/evck.html), and if you wish to ob
tain the SVCS code, please send an e-mail to oxk2361@cs.rit.edu.
The simple SVCS example presented below consists of 3 shares and de
codes 3 secret images. Each of the three combinations of 2 shares produces
a secret image. The user is required to provide the secret images and ini
tial share images, which must all have identical dimensions and formats or
the program will halt. All image files must be in .PNG format. The program
generates the share images by analyzing the provided secret images and over
writes the initial share images provided by the user. Furthermore, the user
can view all resulting share images and the results of the superposition of
any two share images in a GUI environment.
Figure A.l: Secret Image 1
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Figure A.2: Secret Image 2
Figure A.3: Secret Image 3
A.l Share Images
Figure A.4: Share Image 1
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Figure A.5: Share Image 2
Figure A.6: Share Image 3
A.2 Superposition of Share Images
^ili^RK^S
Figure A. 7: Superposition of Share Image 1 and Share Image 2
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Figure A.8: Superposition of Share Image 1 and Share Image 3
Figure A. 9: Superposition of Share Image 2 and Share Image 3
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